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Who receives more acceptable job o¤ers, the unemployed or the employed? Answering this
question is important for several reasons. First, if unemployed search is more e¤ective than
employed search a case can be made that risk aversion amongst the unemployedor externalities
in the search process warrant the subsidising of unemployment. The argument – made at least
as early as Burdett (1979) – is that if job o¤ers in employment arrive infrequently then an
initial ‘bad choice’ cannot be easily corrected resulting in less e¢cient outcomes. Marimon
and Zillibotti (1999), for example, argue that individuals who accept unsuitable jobs reduce
the availability of such jobs for others who are better suited. Consequently, bad job matches
made by the unemployed out of …nancial necessity should be avoided. These views have
led many to advocate using unemployment bene…ts to subsidise unemployed job search as a
means of increasing e¢ciency in the labour market (for example, Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999;
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
At the same time, if the employed receive at least as many job o¤ers as the unemployed,
then arguments in favour of unemployment bene…ts as a search subsidy become less valid.
Indeed, if job o¤ers arrive more frequently during employment then subsidising unemployment
may lead to higher unemployment levels and be counterproductive.
Second, there are also theoretical reasons to be concerned about relative job o¤er arrival
rates. Assumptions about the relative frequency ofjobo¤ers during employment andunemploy-
ment form a key component of many job search models. The standard Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) model of wage heterogeneity amongst homogeneous individuals presumes for example
that employed and unemployed job-o¤er arrival rates are the same. Empirical applications of
1this model, such as in Bontemps et al. (2000) depend upon the plausibility of this assumption
as does the theoretical framework in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). On the other hand, Van
den Berg (1990), Frijters and Van der Klaauw (2001), and Flinn and Heckman (1982) assume
that the job-o¤er arrival rate for the employed is zero and applications of these models rest
heavily on this assumption.
Despite the importance of the issue, the empirical evidence is limited. Early results for US
youth suggest that search intensity is higher in unemployment than in employment resulting
in more job o¤ers while unemployed, although the estimated wage returns to unemployed
search are not necessarily higher (see Kahn and Low, 1982; 1984; Holzer, 1987). At the same
time, employed search is signi…cantly more e¢cient than unemployed searchfor Dutch students
(Van der Klaauw et al., 2004), while Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) show that twice as many
workers in the UK choose on-the-job search rather thanquitting into full-time search indicating
that workers themselves see a relative bene…t in searching on the job. Moreover, Jackman et
al. (1989) argue that in the UK the e¢ciency of job search by the unemployed declined relative
to the e¢ciency of employed job search in the decades leading up to 1989.
Our objective is to shed new light on these issues by investigating whether ‘acceptable’ job
o¤ers occur more frequently in employment than in unemployment. We avoid the selectiv-
ity associated with initial employment state by utilising information on rejected job o¤ers for
individuals who are observed searching for jobs both in employment and in non-employment.
Using this identi…cation strategy, we then non-parametrically estimate separate employed and
non-employed wage-o¤er distributions taking advantage of unique data from a large panel sur-
vey of job seekers in Australia. Unlike alternative data sources, these data provide information
over a period of three years about monthly (as opposed to annual) job o¤ers, the beginning and
2end dates of both employed and non-employed search spells, and annual reports of reservation
wages. Detailed information about search outcomes (including rejected job o¤ers) for large
samples of employed and unemployed job seekers is fairly uncommon and allows us to account
for selectivity associated with initial employment state as well as the endogeneity of search
e¤ort.
Our results indicate that o¤er arrival rates in employment and unemployment do not di¤er
signi…cantly. Employed and unemployed job seekers in Australia are essentially equally likely
to receive acceptable job o¤ers. In this respect, the Australian labour market appears to be
more similar to that of Northern Europe – where the unemployed are less likely to receive job
o¤ers – and less like the United States where unemployed job search is perhaps more e¢cient
than employed search.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set out our theoretical
framework and derive our estimation equations. In Section 3, we describe the data and focus
on the unconditional ratio of employed tounemployed job-o¤er arrival rates. Following that, we
present our estimation results paying particular attention to placing our results in the context




Our goal is to develop a theoretical framework which captures the essence of the job search
process, exploits the relative strengths of our data (see the discussion below), and provides
a sensible backdrop against which to interpret our results. To this end, we develop a semi-
structuralmodel whichallows us todeal withtheselectivity ofthoseinemployment, …xed-e¤ects
in wage-o¤er distributions, and unobserved heterogeneity in job-o¤er arrival rates.
We begin by taking a simpli…ed stationary job-search environment in which individuals
undertake directed (or systematic) search in order to …nd jobs (see for example, Kahn and
Low, 1988; 1990; Gregg and Petrongolo 2000). While undirected (or random) search would
result in job o¤ers periodically arriving from randomly encountered employers, directed search
implies that an unemployed individual i only applies for jobs that pay a wage higher than or
equal to his or her individual-speci…c reservation wage ( ¸ wi): This directed search framework
seems reasonable given the self-reported nature of job o¤ers in our data. In fact, nearly all
unemployed job seekers have latent job o¤ers to become self-employed street vendors or ‡oor
sweepers at the nearest fast-food restaurant. These latent, low-paid job o¤ers are clearly not
what people mean when they report to have had a job o¤er. Reported job o¤ers are in
some sense ‘serious’ o¤ers, and hence better …t a directed search view of the labour market.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that directed search is quite common (Kahn and Low,
1988; 1990).
An observed job o¤er for an unemployed individual consists of a relative wage o¤er drawn
from a distribution F UN( w
¸ wi) where w is the o¤ered wage. In other words, the probability of
4obtaining a speci…c wage o¤er w depends on the level of w relative to the individual-speci…c
reservation wage ¸ wi. Our directed search framework implies that FUN(
w
¸ wi) = 0 for
w
¸ wi < 1.1
Additionally, each individual is assumed to have an individual-speci…c job-o¤er arrival rate ‚i
and job o¤ers are assumed to be rejected with an exogenous probability ￿.2 Job o¤ers may be
rejected, for example, because the non-monetary aspects of thejob turn out to be unsatisfactory
or family circumstances prevent a change of job.
An employed job seeker is assumed to obtain job o¤ers with arrival rate ‚i ¤ – from a
distribution FE( w
¸ wi). We can think of – as capturing the relative search intensity of employed





¸ wi) stems from the possibility that the job pools to which individuals have access
may depend on their employment status. An obvious alternative to this approach would
be to capture di¤erences in employed and unemployed job search by allowing the reservation
wage itself to depend on whether an individual is currently employed or unemployed (as in
Frijters and Kalb, 2003). Our preliminary estimation, however, suggests that individuals’
reservation wages do not change substantially when they either gain or lose jobs (see Appendix
Table A.1). Similarly, we also do not observe signi…cant wage increases as a result of job
changes. These …ndings may stem from the fact that our sample is dominated by low-skilled
individuals for whom the main reason to change jobs is related to travel, family, andjob security
considerations. Given this, we model reservation wages as individual-speci…c and independent
of current employment status.
1In Section 3 we discuss the extent to which this assumption holds in our sample.
2In particular, Devine and Kiefer (1991) note that di¤erences in job search outcomes are mainly due to
di¤erences in arrival rates rather than to di¤erences in the probability of rejecting o¤ers.
52.2 Estimation Strategy
We are interestedin estimating whether job o¤ers occur more frequently in employment than in
unemployment. The theoretical framework outlined above suggests that the relative frequency
of job o¤ers is a function of both relative search e¢ciency in the two labour market states
(–) and divergence in wage o¤er distributions (FE( w
¸ wi) and FUN( w
¸ wi)). Consequently, our
empirical strategy centres around estimating the relative arrival rate of jobs that pay at least
w














where equation (1) can be evaluated across the range of relative wage o¤ers ( w
¸ wi).
Various econometric issues need to be addressedinthe estimationof equation (1). The most
important is the selectivity associated with initial employment state. Individuals observed in
jobs at the start of the data period are not a random sample of all individuals: individuals with
extremely low ‚i are less likely to be observed in employment than those with high ‚i. Kahn
and Low (1982) …nd, for example, that estimates correcting for the selectivity bias associated
with initial employment state suggest that unemployed job seekers receive more o¤ers than
employed job seekers do, though uncorrected results demonstrate the opposite. In order to
circumvent this initial conditions problem, we restrict theestimationsample tothoseindividuals
whom we observe both in employment and unemployment. We can then compare the search
e¢ciency of individuals in employment with their own search intensity in unemployment.
This sample restriction – while useful in dealing with unobserved heterogeneity – makes
it di¢cult to generate estimates of the unconditional, relative search e¢ciency in employment
6versus unemployment across the entire sample of job seekers. In e¤ect, the sample support
includes only those individuals who have received at least one acceptable job o¤er whilst unem-
ployed. Without additional structure regarding the form of individual heterogeneity it would
be di¢cult to recover unconditional estimates from the restricted sample if we were to base the
estimation on accepted job o¤ers.
Consequently, we adopt a multi-step estimation strategy. We …rst estimate the relative
e¢ciency ofemployed versus unemployedsearch(–) disregarding accepted job o¤ers and instead
using only data on the arrival rate of rejected job o¤ers in employment versus unemployment.
Rejected job o¤ers do not su¤er from the same truncationproblem because the sample selection
rule is not based on rejected job o¤ers.
More speci…cally, rejected job-o¤ers arrive at a rate e ‚i = ￿‚i for the unemployed and a
rate –e ‚i = –￿‚i for the employed. For each individual i we observe a sequence {di1;::;diT}
whereby di1 is anindicator function for the existence ofa rejectedjobo¤er inperiodt = f1:::Tg.
Here, time runs only over those periods in which an individual reports active job search and
may hence contain disjoint periods. The set of relevant time periods is denoted as Si: For
each individual, we also de…ne a sequence of indicators {Ei1;::;EiT}that denote whether an
individual is in employment or not.
We use maximum likelihood estimation to generate an estimate of the relative e¢ciency of
employed versus unemployed search, –: The likelihood of the observed sequence of rejected job














7where G(e ‚i) denotes the distribution of e ‚i and the integral should be read in the Lebesque
sense.3 We will allow for heterogeneity in the rejected job-o¤er arrival rate through our choice
of distributions for e ‚i (see Section 4).4
In the second step, we use information regarding accepted wage o¤ers to identify the wage
o¤er distributions FE( w
¸ wi) and F UN( w
¸ wi) assuming that reservation wages are individual-speci…c
and stationary over time. Basing the estimation on accepted wage o¤ers does not generate a
sampleselectionproblemhere, becauseany wage o¤erexceedingthereservationwageis assumed
to be rejected with an exogenous probability ￿. This leads wage o¤ers to be independent of the
probability that serious wage o¤ers (i.e., those exceeding the reservation wage) will be accepted
implying that the sample selection rule is independent of the outcome of interest. Estimated
wage distributions ^ FE( w
¸ wi) and ^ FUN( w
¸ wi) are computed non-parametrically by taking ^ fE( w
¸ wi)
and ^ fUN( w
¸ wi) to be piece-wise constant.
Using estimates derived in these two steps, we then construct our measure of the relative
arrival rate of acceptable job o¤ers, R( w
¸ wi), given in equation (1). Speci…cally,









Because there is some unknown degree of measurement error in wages, we can only derive a
lower bound for the error in this estimate of R( w
¸ wi). That is, the error is at least as high as that
caused by the uncertainty in ^ – and by the …nite-sample uncertainty in ^ FE( w
¸ wi) and ^ FUN( w
¸ wi)
in the absence of measurement errors. To be more precise regarding this latter source of
3In other words, when G(:) is a discrete distribution, the integral becomes a simple sum over all mass-points.
4In particular, we use both discrete mass-point and lognormal distributions to approximate the distribution
of e ‚i:
8uncertainty, suppose n1 out of N individuals accepted a wage higher than a certain
w¤
¸ wi during

















Con…dence intervals can be constructed for ^ R by means of bootstrapping from the separately
estimated con…dence intervals around ^ – and ^ FE( w
¸ wi) and ^ FUN( w
¸ wi).
3 Survey of Employment and Unemployment Patterns
We utilise data derived from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) Survey of Employment
and Unemployment Patterns (SEUP), which detail the work and job-seeking experiences of
individuals over the three-year period 1994 - 1997.5 The public use sample includes 7572
respondents, the majority of whom were either actively seeking work or likely to be entering
the labour market at the time of recruitment.6 Consequently, our focus will be on the job-
o¤er arrival rates of a relatively homogenous, disadvantaged group at risk of unemployment.
Given our interest in understanding the nexus between job o¤ers, reservation wages, and search
5The SEUP sampling frame consists of three separate random samples from the wider Australian population
aged 15 to 59 residing in private dwellings: 1) individuals seeking jobs; 2) a population reference group; and 3)
individuals participating in a labour market program. The public-use data include information about the …rst
two samples only and consequently, individuals participating in labour market programs have been excluded
from the analysis. For more detailed information about the SEUP data see ABS, (1997; 1998).
6The Jobseeker group comprises those who, at the time of recruitment (April-June 1995), were: unemployed,
underemployed (working less than ten hours per week and looking for a job with more hours), discouraged from
job search or not in the labour force but likely to enter the labour force in the near future. Thus this group is
sampled from a stock of unemployed/underemployed individuals rather than the in‡ow of unemployed and as
a result they are selected to be more disadvantaged than the average person entering unemployment.
9behaviour, we have excluded full-time students, family workers and self-employed individuals
from the sample, so that 5223 individuals remain.7 The SEUP data can be combined to form
sequences of work and non-work spells. Periods of job search are also recorded so that a job
search indicator can be constructedfor eachwork/non-work spell. Of the 2315 individuals who
areobservedto engageinjobsearch atsome point intheperiod, weselectedthe1577individuals
who are observed in both employment and unemployment. These individuals constitute our
estimation sample.
For each of the work spells identi…ed in the SEUP data, job information such as earn-
ings, hours of work, occupation and industry is available. Wage-related information in the
data includes reservation wages for all individuals seeking work (independent of their current
employment status), acceptance wages in new jobs that occur after a non-working spell, and
wages in current jobs.8 Finally, individuals seeking work reported the timing of any job o¤ers
along with an indication of whether the o¤er had been accepted or rejected.
This information is used to construct the main variables of interest. In particular, we
constructed a monthly indicator variable for the arrival of at least one job o¤er as well as in-
dicators of whether speci…c job o¤ers were accepted or not. We also constructed a measure
of acceptance wages. This information is directly reported for new jobs that follow a spell of
nonwork. For new jobs that follow employment spells, the acceptance wage equals the …rst
reported wage after the new job begins. In both cases, we replaced the relevant categorical
wage with a prediction based on all available individual information (including, for example,
7Full-time students are excluded because for them full-time study provides an additional alternative to work
and non-work. Self-employed individuals and family workers are excluded because a participation decision
based on reservation and market wages is not relevant for them in the same way as it is for wage and salary
earners.
8SEUP wage information is reported categorically using 28 possible categories.
10education, occupation, hours of work and experience) and the reported wage category.9 This
procedure may generate measurement errors and we consider this issue further below. Simi-
larly, we constructed individual reservation wages by estimating a model of reservation wages
(including …xed individual-speci…c e¤ects), and calculating a predicted reservation wage for
individuals who have just become unemployed (see Table A1).
Although theSEUP data also contain limitedinformationon individuals’ socio-demographic
characteristics, we do not use it in our estimation. These data are collected on an annual basis
and there is no information about the monthly timing of changes in these characteristics. As
a result, the use of these characteristics is somewhat limited (see Frijters and Kalb, 2003, for a
full exposition). We treat this missing information as unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to highlight the underlying patterns in the data, summary statistics for the main
variables of interest are given in Table 1 by gender, employment status, job-search status and
disability status. Interestingly, the raw data reveal only slight di¤erences in job-o¤er arrival
rates between employed and unemployed job seekers. While the employed who are searching
for new jobs receive an o¤er every 151 days on average, the unemployed receive job o¤ers every
141 days. There also appears to be little di¤erence in job-o¤er arrival rates for unemployed
men and women. On average, unemployed men in the sample receive a job o¤er every 179
days, while unemployed women receive job o¤ers on average every 167 days. The gender gap
in o¤er arrival rates amongst the employed is even smaller.
Moreover, the reservation wages of employed searchers ($11.39 in the …rst job) are slightly
higher than for unemployed searchers ($11.06), but the di¤erence is small. Men have both
9Speci…cally, each individual is assigned the expected value from his or her predicted wage distribution
conditional on the reported wage interval.
11higher reservation wages and higher actual wages than women. There is surprisingly little
di¤erence in the wages of those who continue searching while employed and those who stop
searching. Taken together these results indicate that the di¤erences between employed and
unemployed job seekers in our sample may be quite small.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Dependent Variables
wage res. res. res. # job o¤. Expected #
wage 1 wage 2 wage 3 per day days before
an o¤er
number of obs. 7852 1102 2740 2493 18257 18257
not in employment 11.06 10.82 11.15 0.0058 172
out of the labour force 0.0032 312
unemployed 11.06 10.82 11.15 0.0071 141
by gender
man 11.54 10.82 11.35 0.0056 179
woman 10.60 10.82 10.90 0.0060 167
by disability
yes 11.09 10.94 11.06 0.0047 213
no 11.04 10.77 11.21 0.0064 156
in employment 13.73 11.39 11.33 11.97 0.0038 263
work, no search 13.69 0.0026 385
work and search 13.85 11.39 11.33 11.97 0.0066 151
by gender
man 13.99 12.34 11.64 12.49 0.0037 270
woman 13.46 10.50 10.99 11.41 0.0038 263
Finally, we ascertain the degree of variation in the data by examining the estimated distri-
bution of the reported reservation wage (see Figure 1). The distribution of reservation wages
appears to be lognormal, with approximately 95 per cent of the probability mass between 1.2
and 2.6 implying a standard deviation of roughly 0.35.
12Figure 1: Empirical Reservation Distribution





























































4.1 Job-o¤er Arrival Rates
The likelihood function we are seeking to maximise is given in equation (2). We begin by
noting that several alternative speci…cations can be used to approximate the distribution of
the arrival rate of rejected job o¤ers across individuals, G(e ‚i): The most ‡exible possibility
is to take a discrete distribution for G(e ‚i) with K points of support. In other words,which
for large K can approach any distribution function. We considered a range of values for K
including K=20, K=5, K=3, andK=2. Surprisingly, in all cases there was convergence of all K
points towards a single point ￿k indicating very little heterogeneity in rejectedo¤er arrival rates
13P[e ‚i = ￿k] = pk
1 ¸ pk ¸ 0




(e ‚i).10 Additionally, we considered a lognormal distribution for e ‚i with a mid-point of ￿ and
a standard deviation of ￿￿: The results for the discrete distribution (K=2) and the lognormal
speci…cation are presented in Table 2.11
Table 2: Estimation Results for the Distribution of Rejected
Job-o¤er Arrival Rates G(e ‚i), and Relative Search Intensity –
2 Discrete-points Lognormal








Average Likelihood ¡6:2684 ¡6:2683
10We validated the program by testing it on arti…cial data with 2 and 5 points of support, all with equal mass-
weight, – = 1; geometrically spaced hazard rates (a factor of 2 between each successive point), and N=1577.
There were no convergence problems and the estimates were all within 1 per cent of the actual values.
11When using the lognormal distribution, we truncate the distribution to avoid values of ‚i greater than 1.
This did not turn out to be important however, because of the negligible probability mass in that region.
14We begin the discussion by noting that the likelihoods are virtually the same for the two
models. The discrete-point model has clearly become unidenti…ed (which resulted in t-values
of 0). However, the estimates for relative search e¢ciency in the two employment states (–)
and the midpoint of the arrival rate of rejected job o¤ers (e ‚i) are the same for both models.
What do these results tell us about rejected job-o¤er arrival rates for employed and un-
employed workers? First, it is interesting that the discrete distribution results indicate little
evidence of heterogeneity in arrival rates. In part, this re‡ects the homogeneity of the sam-
ple itself. Individuals in our sample are in general job seekers with limited labour market
prospects.12 Homogeneity in arrival rates also re‡ects the fact that we focus on self-reported,
rejected job o¤ers in a directed search environment. This implies that the results do not in-
clude the usual heterogeneity across individuals for job o¤ers with an absolute wage w. It is
certainly the case that some individuals are more likely to receive a high-wage job o¤er than
others are. However in this model, reported job o¤ers for di¤erent individuals do not come
from the same wage distribution. Therefore, most heterogeneity is captured in the di¤erent
reservation wages.
More importantly, the 95 per cent con…dence interval for – is [0.68,1.09] when using the
lognormal distribution (see Table 2). Thus, this con…dence interval includes 1 indicating that
we cannot reject the possibility that the searchintensity or e¢ciency is the same in employment
and unemployment.
In order to understand how the frequency of job o¤ers varies with employment status,
however, we also need to focus on the nature of the job-o¤er distributions themselves. In
12In fact, the predicted rate of rejected job o¤ers is only once every 15 months, while the rate of accepted job
o¤ers is once every 9.5 months.
15Figure 2, the estimated wage distributions ^ FE(
w
¸ wi) and ^ FUN(
w
¸ wi) are presented along with the
estimated relative arrival rate of jobs that pay at least
w
¸ wi in employment versus unemployment
(^ R(w)): The …rst thing to note is that – contrary to theoretical predictions – observed wages are
Figure 2: Distribution of Accepted Wages Relative to Reservation
Wages and Implied Relative Job-o¤er Arrival Rate
Distribution of Accepted Wages Relative to Reservation Wages and Implied 
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higher than reported reservation wages in only 94 per cent of cases. This …nding is consistent
with other empirical evidence and may indicate the presence of measurement error in actual
and/or reservation wages.13
Figure 2 also demonstrates that the estimated distributions ^ FE( w
¸ wi) and ^ F UN( w
¸ wi) are very
close. Most importantly, ^ FE( w
¸ wi) does not stochastically dominate ^ FUN( w
¸ wi); which is contrary
13Holzer (1987), for example, …nds for the US that on average the hourly wages of o¤ers accepted by the
employed are less than the average reservation wages amongst those employed individuals with job o¤ers.
16to expectations. Indeed, only in theregion 1:4 <
w
¸ wi < 1:6 are the twodistributions signi…cantly
di¤erent at the 95 per cent con…dence level. In that range, o¤ered wages are clearly higher in
employment, as expected. Over much of the range, however, there is little di¤erence in the
wages o¤ered to employed and unemployed job seekers. In part, this may re‡ect the fact that
many individuals in our sample who search while employed have unnattractive or insecure jobs
and hence do not necessarily search for higher paying jobs.
Finally, we discuss the point estimates for R( w
¸ wi). The most important aspect of this graph
is that across most of the relevant wage range, the point estimates of R( w
¸ wi) are larger than ^ –
and indicate that (1¡ ^ F E(
w
¸ wi))=(1¡ ^ FUN(
w
¸ wi)) > 1:This implies that job o¤ers in employment
are slightly though not signi…cantly higher than in unemployment. Most importantly, across
the entire range of possible values for w
¸ wi it is the case that ^ R( w
¸ wi) is not signi…cantly di¤erent
from 1 at the 90 per cent con…dence level.14 Its point estimate for the mid-point of the
^ FE( w
¸ wi) distribution (when w
¸ wi ¼ 1:91) is 0.99 which is extremely close to 1. Consequently, the
overarching conclusion from this analysis is that there is no evidence for di¤erential job-o¤er
probabilities in employment versus unemployment.
4.2 Discussion
InAustralia, theprobability ofreceivingajobo¤erislargelyindependentofcurrent employment
status. Consequently, searching while unemployed does not generate an e¢ciency gain for the
economy as a whole through a quicker matching of vacancies and job searchers. In this respect
the Australian labour market is like that of Northern Europe, where the unemployed are less
14The standard deviation of ^ R is about 0.2.
17likely to obtain job o¤ers than are the employed15, and unlike the United States where the
unemployed seem more able than the employed to search for new jobs.16
While unemployment in the US could be argued to improve the matching function of the
labour market, the same cannot be claimed for unemployment in Australia or Northern Europe
where unemployment is better seen as a sheer production loss.
It is di¢cult to know whether these disparities in research …ndings stem from di¤erences in
the institutional arrangements for administering unemployment bene…ts or from the speci…cs
of the data sample, analysis period, and estimation strategy. Results based upon a group of
disadvantaged job seekers looking for work in a period of relatively high unemployment may
not readily translate to other groups operating under other labour market conditions. At the
same time, di¤erences across countries in the relative e¢ciency of employed versus unemployed
search are likely to be due in part to institutional di¤erences. In Australia, unlike many
other countries, unemployment bene…ts are non-contributory, funded from general revenue,
and comprise one component of a broader system of income-support payments administered by
the Australian government. Payment levels are uniform across the country, do not depend on
previous work history, and are not time limited. This stands in sharp contrast to the social
insurance model operating inthe United States. Moreover the easier dismissal procedures inthe
United States – which might make employers less reluctant to employ people who are currently
unemployed (i.e. employers are more prone to ignore the signalling aspect of unemployment in
cases where dismissal is easier) – may also play a role. Finally, it is also possible that there are
15Some evidence for this is found by Boeri (1999). He shows that an increase of workers on short-term jobs,
who are likely to be on-the-job searchers, reduces the ‡ow from unemployment to employment using information
from a number of countries. See also Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) and Jackman, et al. (1989).
16See an overview of a few articles in Devine and Kiefer (1991: pp. 254-255).
18equilibrium e¤ects driving this di¤erence. In particular, it is possible that to be a (short-term)
unemployed individual searching for a job is not taken to be a bad signal in the United States
whereas it is in Australia and Europe.
5 Conclusions
The relationship between current employment status and the e¢ciency of job search has im-
plications for theoretical models of job search behaviour and for public policies targeting the
unemployed. If unemployed search is more e¤ective than employed search, a case can be made
that subsidising unemployment may improve labour market e¢ciency. At the same time, if the
employed receive at least as many job o¤ers as the unemployed, thensubsidising unemployment
may lead to higher unemployment levels and be counterproductive.
We investigated the relative e¢ciency of employed versus unemployed job search using
unique data from a panel survey of job seekers in Australia. Unlike other standard data
sets, these data provide information about both accepted and rejected job o¤ers. Using a
semi-structural estimation model, we found that job-o¤er arrival rates in employment and
unemployment are not signi…cantly di¤erent.
In this respect, the Australian labour market is like that of Northern Europe where un-
employed job search is less or equally e¢cient, and unlike the United States where there are
e¢ciency gains to searching while unemployed. Unemployment bene…ts inAustralia, therefore,
have no e¤ect on the e¢ciency of job search, but rather serve a redistributive function. This
…nding lends empirical support to the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model and others like it
which allow for employed job search and assume the job-o¤er arrival rate in employment to be
19equal to that in unemployment.
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22Appendix 1
Results from the Fixed-E¤ect Reduced Form Estimations
Table A.1 presents the reduced-form, …xed-e¤ect analyses of wages and reservation wages.
These …rst di¤erence models shed light on the variation in wages and reservation wages across
time and individual characteristics. Note how the low standard deviation in reservation wage
changes (0.039) compares to the much larger standard deviation in the levels of reservation
wages (about 0.3), implying that over 90 per cent of the variation in reservation levels is due
to constant individual-speci…c factors.
Table A.1: Fixed-e¤ect Analyses of Starting Wages ~ wit and Reservation Wages ~ `it
Using the Australian SEUP Data
4 ln ~ wit 4ln ~ `it
Variables coef. t-val coef. t-val
Individual characteristics:
intercept 0.022 1.4 -0.011 0.9
4t 0.00011 2.8 0.00015 3.8
…rst employment spell -0.07 0.6
currently employed 0.035 1.8
current unemployment duration -0.000023 1.2
cumulative unemployment duration 0.00013 2.5 -0.000011 0.4
current employment duration 0.00007 4.1 0.000035 0.9
(cum. unem.dur.)*(30·age<40) -0.00014 3.0 -0.00011 2.1
(cum. unem.dur.)*(40·age<50) -0.00015 2.7 -0.000002 0.0
(cum. unem.dur.)*(50·age<60) -0.00016 2.2 -0.00012 1.9
￿m;` 0.039
Number of observations 5267 3713
Number of individuals 1892 1576
R2 0.02 0.02
The other available time-varying regressors were: previous wage, duration of last employment/unemployment
spell, part-time studying, # children, have a partner, disability, hours of work,education levels, and urban hous-
ing. The shown speci…cation includes the most relevant and signi…cant variables: none of the other variables
added signi…cantly to the explained variance.
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